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NOTE
A  DISPROPORTIONATE  RESPONSE?  THE  2015
PROPORTIONALITY  AMENDMENTS  TO
FEDERAL  RULE  OF  CIVIL
PROCEDURE 26(B)
Matthew T. Ciulla*
INTRODUCTION
When many people think of the American legal system, they think of a
lawyer clamoring to “bury her opponent in boxes of documents” and to file a
“blizzard of document requests, interrogatories, and deposition notices” in a
dilatory effort to gain any trial advantage possible.1  Popular media outlets
frequently highlight anecdotal examples of overwhelming discovery produc-
tions, inevitably leading to the conclusion that our system of civil justice is out
of control.2  Indeed, the fabled “document dump” has become a common
trope in American works of fiction.3
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Science,
Vanderbilt University, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his guidance
on this Note, my family for their endless support, and the Notre Dame Law Review team for
all of their work.
1 See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 901
(1996).
2 See, e.g., Kathy McCabe, Confidential Data Released as Saugus Legal Fight Grinds On,
BOS. GLOBE (June 5, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/06/05/blowing-
whistle-saugus/EZHyCiW0KfosiXLRke6t1H/story.html (describing discovery production
of 49,000 pages of material, including “copies of flu shot reminders and snow removal
notices” and inadvertently-disclosed personal information, in an apparent “document
dump” intended to “bury . . . in needless material” opposing counsel); Scott Morgan, Judge
Blasts Prosecutors in Wells Fargo Mortgage Insurance Lawsuit, MREPORT (Apr. 8, 2015), http://
www.themreport.com/news/government/04-08-2015/judge-blasts-prosecutors-in-wells-
fargo-mortgage-insurance-lawsuit (explaining that prosecutors in a civil case were chided
for “overwhelming” the defendant with “millions of documents,” giving defendants “no
time to review the documents so close to the discovery deadline”).
3 See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, SYCAMORE ROW 436 (2013) (“A ‘document dump’ was a
common dirty trick . . . , in which [a party] hid discoverable documents until the last
possible moment.  They then dumped several thousand pages of documents on the oppos-
1395
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These societal concerns about the discovery process have not gone
unnoticed by federal rulemakers4: on December 1, 2015, a set of amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.5  Among the most
significant and contentious of these changes is the Rules’ renewed focus on
the concept of proportionality in the scope of discovery, added in an effort to
curb perceived over-discovery.6  Although 2014 Rule 26(b)7—the Rule best
poised to “rei[n] in the cost, delay and burdens of discovery”8—could have
been said to invoke the concept of proportionality, it did so in a bifurcated
and implicit manner,9 substantially undermining any purported ability the
2014 Rule had to make the discovery process more efficient or effective.10
Additionally, the 2014 Rule allowed for broad subject-matter discovery on a
ing lawyer just before the trial, knowing he and his staff could not possibly dig through
them in time.”); MELISSA F. MILLER, IMPROPER INFLUENCE 35–36 (2013) (describing a “doc-
ument dump” as a “classic move” in which a party has waited for the discovery deadline to
“deliver of a stack of boxes full of documents,” and the “big firm overwhelms the sole
practitioner with paper”).
4 See, e.g., Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 6–7 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18218/ (inter-
preting a particular survey as finding that “today’s civil litigation system takes too long and
costs too much” and noting that almost half of that survey’s respondents “believed that
discovery is abused in almost every case”).
5 See id.; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 114-33, at 2, 31 (2015) (offering the Supreme Court’s
transmission of the 2015 changes to Congress for its approval).
6 See, e.g., Stephen J. MacGillivray & Raymond M. Ripple, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Amendments on the Horizon, R.I. B. J., May/June 2014, at 15, 18–19 (noting that “[t]he
proposed amendments have received a mixed and highly contentious response from the
public,” with “the most heated debate” focusing largely “on the concept of proportional-
ity . . . and whether [the new rules] will unfairly limit a litigant’s ability to obtain the
necessary discoverable information to prepare for trial”).
7 For the sake of clarity, this Note will refer to the Rules as they were in 2014 as “2014
Rules.”
8 Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm,
Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 517 (2010).
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014), reprinted in STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, 113TH CONGRESS, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 36 (Comm. Print 2014) [herein-
after 2014 FED. R.] (defining the general scope of discovery and incorporating by reference
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra, at
37 (tacitly establishing a proportionality rule for discovery by instructing courts to “limit
the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory
Committee’s Note (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 217 (1983) (providing that one goal
of Rule 26(b) is to “guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the
court authority to reduce the amount of discovery”).
10 See generally Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 517–24 (explaining that although Rule
26(b) could offer protection against disproportionate discovery, its “protections lie dor-
mant” in practice, and asserting that federal litigation currently operates under a “default
rule of broad and liberal discovery”).
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showing of good cause,11 which, in theory, broadened the scope of discovery
and further blunted any proportionality protections inherent in the Rule.12
Conversely, the amended Rule 26(b) explicitly requires all parties to a
case—and the presiding judge—to limit the scope of discovery to
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.13
As such, the Advisory Committee has explicitly endorsed proportional
discovery.14  This step addressed some of the discovery issues that the Com-
mittee has attributed to the previous structure of Rule 26(b),15 including
courts not applying the proportionality factors16 and courts applying the fac-
tors without the “proportionality” label17—issues that the Committee
believed only furthered the purportedly rampant issue of over-discovery.
This Note argues that the new Rule 26(b) is not likely to substantially
further the Committee’s professed goals.  Specifically, this Note shows that,
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 36 (“For
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action.”).
12 However, such subject-matter discovery was rarely invoked in federal litigation. ADVI-
SORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK FOR APR. 10–11, 2014, at 103 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter 2014 AGENDA BOOK], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486/ (“The [Advisory]
Committee has been informed that [the subject-matter discovery language of Rule
26(b)(1)] is rarely invoked.”).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
14 The Committee most recently attempted to achieve the same with its 2000 addition
of the following sentence to Rule 26(b)(1): “All discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2000),
reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 390 (2000) (noting that “a sentence has been added calling
attention to the [proportionality] limitations . . . [as] courts have not implemented these
limitations with the vigor that was contemplated”).  The Committee noted that it added
“[t]his otherwise redundant cross-reference . . . to emphasize the need for active judicial
use” of the proportionality limitations in order “to control excessive discovery.” Id.  How-
ever, this sentence did not achieve its intended effect. See, e.g., Netzorg & Kern, supra note
8, at 517 (“[T]he default rule in favor of virtually unlimited discovery of any relevant fact
routinely prevails.”).
15 But see infra text accompanying notes 71–102.
16 Some believed, especially in the modern world replete with troves of electronically
stored information (ESI), that 2014 Rule 26(b) inadequately protected against over-discov-
ery by failing to emphasize the importance of keeping the scope of discovery proportional.
See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
4 & n.9 (2013), https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/1778 (“Notwithstanding
the foregoing amendments, courts have not always insisted on proportionality when it was
warranted. . . . In the electronic era, it has become increasingly important for courts and
parties to apply the proportionality doctrine to manage the large volume of ESI and associ-
ated expenses now typical in litigation.”).
17 See, e.g., id. at 4 & n.10 (collecting cases).
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even if over-discovery is a rampant problem with proportionality as its solu-
tion—a contention that is not well supported by empirical evidence—the
new Rule 26(b) does little that will effect change in federal civil litigation
practice.  Part I provides a brief historical perspective of Rule 26 with an
emphasis on prior efforts to instill a proportional scope of discovery—albeit
without the label—in the litigation process.  Part II explores whether or not
over-discovery is a prevalent problem, as asserted by the Committee.  Part III
analyzes the expected impact of the Rule change on parties requesting and
resisting discovery in relation to the Committee’s stated goal of curtailing
what it sees as rampant over-discovery.
I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF RULE 26 AND THE PROPORTIONAL
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
A. The Inception of Modern Discovery
Modern discovery has been available to federal litigants since the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.18  Before these Rules,
the realm of discoverable information was linked to trial admissibility,19
which led to a “‘cumbersome’ system of elaborate fact recitation and highly
technical code-pleading” at the inception of the litigation.20  This arduous
code-pleading process “disadvantaged poor or unsophisticated litigants,
often resulting in resolution of claims on pleading technicalities instead of
the merits of the case.”21  The Federal Rules removed this standard and
adopted a far more liberal “notice pleading” standard,22 promoting “citizen
access to the courts and . . . the resolution of disputes on their merits.”23  The
resultant “liberalization of discovery” through the adoption of Rules 26–37
left the discovery process with “three distinct purposes,” namely:
(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be necessary to
produce evidence only on a residue of matters that are found to be actually
disputed and controverted.
(2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial.
18 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991).
19 Id.
20 Christopher C. Frost, Note, The Sound and the Fury or the Sound of Silence?: Evaluating
the Pre-Amendment Predictions and Post-Amendment Effects of the Discovery Scope-Narrowing Lan-
guage in the 2000 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 37 GA. L. REV. 1039,
1047 (2003) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
21 Id.
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 12 (A claim
for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief . . . .”).
23 Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 587–88 (2011). See generally Ray Worthy
Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal
Dilemma, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1191, 1201–04 (2010) (offering a historical overview of the
notice pleading standard); Miller, supra.
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(3) To secure information about the existence of evidence that may be
used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may be procured.24
However, although a broad discovery scope may have served these goals,
the ensuing years saw a new purported problem emerge: over-discovery.25
Litigants in some trials began spending large sums of money and time on
discovery26—sometimes for abusive reasons.27  Because broad discovery was a
natural corollary to notice pleading28 and was so engrained in the ethos of
American civil procedure,29 it was difficult for many to envision a system that
maintained the notice pleading standard while curtailing purported over-dis-
covery.30  Indeed, Fourth Circuit Judge Paul V. Niemeyer wrote in 1998:
“Despite any temptation to engage in this debate, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee cannot, in any practical way, now attempt to undo the 1938
experiment of notice pleading coupled with broad discovery because that
24 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 18
(3d. ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 71–102.
26 See, e.g., DNIC Brokerage Co. v. Morrison & Dempsey Commc’ns, Inc., No. 87-3406,
1989 WL 418806, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 1989), rev’d, 960 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (find-
ing a “clear and flagrant abuse of the litigation process” when counsel “on numerous occa-
sions propounded massive yet unnecessary discovery . . . caus[ing] opposing counsel and
the court to engage in time-consuming and expensive efforts to analyze and comprehend
thousands of pages of what most often proved to be irrelevant material”).
27 See, e.g., id.  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 635, 638 (1989) (describing discovery as “nuclear war” and describing impositional
discovery). But see Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Com-
mittees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1130–40 (2015) (asserting that the Committee’s empirical
support regarding disproportionate discovery was “manufactured”); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994) (“There is no strong evidence
documenting the alleged massive discovery abuse in the federal courts.”).  For a more thor-
ough explanation of this disagreement, see infra text accompanying notes 71–102.
28 See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
299, 300 (2002) (explaining that to the drafters of the Federal Rules, very broad discovery
scope was “a needed complement to notice pleading”); see also John S. Beckerman, Con-
fronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 517 (2000) (“[T]he information-
gathering and issue-defining functions that discovery must perform in a notice-pleading
regime require broad and often copious discovery . . . .”).
29 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts . . . is essential to proper litigation.  To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.”); Karen A. Feagle, Extraterritorial
Discovery: A Social Contract Perspective, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 297, 297 (1996) (“The
basic philosophy of the U.S. system of discovery is that justice is best served when, prior to
trial, litigants in a civil action fully disclose all information potentially pertinent to the
claim at issue.”).
30 See, e.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in
Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520 (1998).
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formula has become embedded in the infrastructure of American civil
procedure.”31
B. Attempting to Curtail Purported Over-Discovery
Despite these concerns, both the Advisory Committee and the Supreme
Court have taken steps that have affected the scope of discovery.  The first
major recent attempt to circumscribe the scope of discovery came on Decem-
ber 1, 2000.32  Before this date, parties were entitled to “obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action.”33  Such “relevance” was interpreted very
broadly, and “the reach of discovery extended to any matter that had a bear-
ing upon . . . any issue in the case.”34  Although requiring a showing of “rele-
vance” could be said to be an early form of discovery scope narrowing, this
supposed hurdle precluded only the most extremely inappropriate discovery
requests, with one court stating merely that “[d]iscovery of information that
has no conceivable bearing on the case” was barred.35
The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules, however, significantly mod-
ified the language defining the scope of discovery.36  Rather than pegging
the relevance question to the subject matter at issue, the 2000 version of Rule
26(b)(1) allowed for discovery only regarding a matter “that is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party.”37  Parties were still permitted to obtain relevant
subject-matter discovery—the former default scope—but only with the
court’s finding of good cause.38  The Committee therefore created a two-tier
discovery process, in which parties were “free to engage in ‘party-controlled’
or ‘attorney-managed’ discovery,” and, when they were “unable to agree as to
whether a discovery request [met the] relevancy standard, the responsibility
31 Id.
32 However, the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure included many judicial
checks on the scope of discovery by requiring leave of court for discovery devices. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 647, 694 (1938) (allowing depositions
“[b]y leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant” and before
the answer was served).  Many of these judicial checks were removed in the subsequent
amendments, contributing to the extremely broad, party-managed discovery to which we
have become accustomed. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (1947),
reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 433, 453 (1946) (“The amendment eliminates the requirement of
leave of court for the taking of a deposition [in most circumstances] . . . .”).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 535, 612 (1993).
34 Christine L. Childers, Note, Keep on Pleading: The Co-Existence of Notice Pleading and
the New Scope of Discovery Standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 36 VAL. U. L. REV.
677, 694 (2002).  See generally 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
¶¶ 26.06, 26.07[1] & n.4 (2d ed. 1996) (“Relevance is construed broadly, allowing discov-
ery of matters within the knowledge of the party seeking it, of opinions and conclusions,
and of matters not directly admissible in evidence.”).
35 Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 388 (2000).
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 Id.
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shift[ed] to the court.”39  This contentious40 change was aimed at
“[c]oncerns about costs and delay of discovery,” especially when “parties seek
to justify discovery requests that sweep [so] far beyond the claims and
defenses of the parties on the ground that they nevertheless have a bearing
on the ‘subject matter’ involved in the action.”41  It sought to address these
concerns by “involv[ing] the court more actively in regulating the breadth of
sweeping or contentious discovery,” as “involvement of the court in manag-
ing discovery is an important method of controlling problems of inappropri-
ately broad discovery.”42
As one can deduce, such a change, in isolation, would likely have had
little effect, as litigants and courts would still be required to interpret the
word “relevant,” which was one of the main sources of ambiguity in the pre-
2000 Rules.43  However, the Committee included a second change to the
nature of Rule 26(b) in the 2000 Amendments: the addition of the final sen-
tence of 2014 Rule 26(b)(1),44 explicitly subjecting all discovery to the limita-
tions imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
First added to Rule 26(b) in the 1983 Amendments,45 these limiting fac-
tors, as they read in 2014, directed that the court “must” limit the scope of
discovery if:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less bur-
densome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
39 Childers, supra note 34, at 697.
40 See generally Niemeyer, supra note 30, at 519–20 (outlining the arguments of both
the proponents and detractors).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340,
388–89 (2000).
42 Id. at 389.
43 Additionally, the Committee noted that “[t]he dividing line between information
relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the
action cannot be defined with precision,” another source of ambiguity in the post-2000
Rules. Id.  Perhaps this was a factor in why the subject-matter discovery language was rarely
invoked: parties simply framed their discovery request as relevant to the claim at issue,
rather than the subject matter at issue.  See 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 103 (noting
that the subject-matter discovery language of Rule 26(b)(1) “is rarely invoked”).  If true,
this further weakens any safeguard characteristics the 2000 Amendments may have had.
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 388 (2000) (“All discov-
ery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) [2014 Rule
26(b)(2)(C)].”).
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 214–15 (1983).
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the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.46
When originally inserting these limitations, the Advisory Committee
sought “to deal with the problem of over-discovery” and to “guard against
redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to
reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are oth-
erwise proper [i.e., ‘relevant’] subjects of inquiry.”47  Touted as a “180-
degree shift” from the former, pre-1983, rule—which barely curtailed discov-
ery, if at all—the new factors aimed to obligate judges “to limit discovery” if
“the evils of redundancy and disproportionality” became “manifest.”48  How-
ever, the impact of these factors has not been as great as imagined by the
1983 drafters.49
The 2000 addition to Rule 26(b)(1) of the sentence specifically calling
attention to the factors50 had similar goals.51  However, in the fifteen years
since its insertion, it has likewise failed to noticeably curtail discovery.52  In
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37.
The factors are largely the same as they originally appeared in 1983. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 214–15 (1983).
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 217
(1983).
48 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 33
(1984).
49 Compare id., with Letter from Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Peter
G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2 (Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter
Miller Comment Letter], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17077 (“[T]he 1983 and 1993
amendments [specifically with regard to the aforementioned factors] do not appear to
have brought about the radical shift in practice I foresaw [in 1983] . . . .”). Accord, FED. R.
CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 390 (2000)
(“[C]ourts have not implemented [the] limitations with the vigor that was
contemplated.”).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 388 (2000) (“All discov-
ery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) [2014 Rule
26(b)(2)(C)].”).
51 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D.
340, 390 (2000) (“This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added to emphasize
the need for active judicial use of [the factors] to control excessive discovery.”).
52 See, e.g., Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 517 (“[T]he default rule in favor of virtu-
ally unlimited discovery of any relevant fact routinely prevails.”).  See generally Paul W.
Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can
Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 515 (2013) (noting that “lawyers
will tell you that the [factors imposing] limits on discovery currently found in [Rule 26]
have not done much to curb overbroad requests,” and that, although the factors could be
“very effective means to protect against overbroad and burdensome discovery,” they will
only do so if they are “actually understood by lawyers and enforced by judges, neither of
which, experience suggests, appears to be the case”); see also 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra
note 12, at 84 (“If the expressions of concern [about over-discovery] reflect widespread
disregard of principles that have been in the rules for thirty years [i.e., the proportionality
factors], it is time to prompt widespread respect and implementation.”).
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sum, the 2000 Amendments—attempting to limit the scope of discovery by
establishing a two-tier “relevancy” test and by highlighting the implicit pro-
portionality factors already present in the Rule—had little actual impact on
the problem of over-discovery.
C. Laying the Foundation for Proportionality from the Bench
Perhaps the most profound narrowing of discovery to date came not
from the Advisory Committee, but from the bench.  With the landmark cases
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly53 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,54 the Supreme Court
substantially narrowed the extremely liberal notice pleading standard—
under which a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss unless “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt” that “no set of facts” would entitle the plaintiff to
relief—that had been explicitly endorsed since at least 1957.55  Instead, the
Court explained that plaintiffs’ complaints must now “state facts showing a
plausible (i.e., more than a ‘conceivable’) claim.”56
This change to the plausibility standard for pleading “necessarily ha[d]
an impact on the whole of pretrial procedure,” including—especially, per-
haps—on discovery.57  And indeed, the Supreme Court expressly considered
the expense of contemporary discovery when deciding Twombly.58  Because
of the ever-increasing costs of litigation—often in the form of voluminous
discovery—“more rigorous pleading requirements” were needed.59  Noting
this, the Supreme Court endorsed the plausibility standard with the goal of
“preventing unworthy discovery and case-management costs.”60  If liberal dis-
covery was a necessary corollary to notice pleading,61 in the post-Twombly/
Iqbal pleading world, liberal discovery “only if discovery costs are not excessive”
seems to be the new desired norm.62
53 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
54 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
55 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dis-
missed . . . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
56 THOMAS D. ROWE ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 (3d ed. 2012).  A full recounting of
the history and impact of Twombly and Iqbal is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 257–67 (5th ed. 2015); ROWE ET AL., supra, at
28–67.
57 Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Proce-
dural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1453 (2008).
58 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
59 T.S. Ellis, III & Nitin Shah, Iqbal, Twombly, and What Comes Next: A Suggested Empiri-
cal Approach, 114 PENN STATIM 64, 66 (2010) (“The decisions . . . are inseparable from their
underlying supposition that dramatic increases in the cost of litigation—and especially dis-
covery—justified the judicial imposition of more rigorous pleading requirements.”).
60 Ryan Mize, Note, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft
v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1257 (2010).
61 See supra note 28.
62 See Chen, supra note 57, at 1454.
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The extent to which the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard appreciably
limits over-discovery stands open to debate.63  Some, of course, disagree with
the decisions on non-discovery grounds,64 and others warn that, although the
pair of cases may solve some discovery problems, “solutions often create
newer and bigger problems.”65  However, to many, “the decision represents a
justified and long overdue expansion of ‘heightened’ pleading that will not
render defendants helpless when faced with discovery costs imposed by futile
complaints, particularly in the realm of complex litigation.”66  At a mini-
mum, to the extent that the plausibility standard allows more motions to dis-
miss to succeed, discovery will be curtailed, as the actions will end much
earlier.67  Likewise, to the extent that the standard forces pre-discovery settle-
ment in cases that otherwise would have moved into discovery, discovery costs
will recede.68
Perhaps the most noticeable way in which Twombly and Iqbal will affect
modern discovery practice is in their influence on the culture of federal liti-
gation.  Despite concerns that traditional notice pleading—and therefore
expansive discovery—was an integral part of the entire structure of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure,69 the Supreme Court nevertheless dramatically
changed the nature of the federal litigation scheme by introducing the plau-
sibility standard.  It is at least conceivable that this shift led to a climate of
63 See, e.g., Ellis & Shah, supra note 59, at 67–68 (noting that, although the new stan-
dard “could well play a useful role” in avoiding “litigation by extortion”—i.e., avoiding
threats of copious discovery to force settlement—Twombly and Iqbal were decided on per-
ceptions, rather than empirical data, of how to manage discovery, and therefore further
study is needed to determine whether or not the decisions will be effective in curtailing
over-discovery).  Of course, if over-discovery is not as great an issue as commonly believed,
nothing would have much of an impact on it, as it simply would not be an issue in a vast
majority of cases. See infra text accompanying notes 71–102.
64 See Mize, supra note 60, at 1247 (“Some view [Twombly] as an unwarranted exten-
sion of the plausibility doctrine . . . .”). See generally Miller, supra note 23, at 593–99.
65 John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set Out in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the
Needs of the Replica Jurisdictions?, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014).
66 Mize, supra note 60, at 1247.
67 However, this premise only holds true if the dismissals are with prejudice (as
opposed to dismissals with leave to amend the complaint).  Many motions to dismiss are
granted without prejudice. See Ellis & Shah, supra note 59, at 69–70.
68 It is not clear, however, that Twombly and Iqbal actually cause fewer cases to go to
discovery through more settlements.  Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assess-
ing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2277 (2012)
(The “settlement-prevented” cases that the author measured “would not reach discovery
under either pleading regime . . . .”).  See generally id. at 2315–24.
69 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that “it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading
standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in [that] case with the liberal system of ‘notice plead-
ing’ set up by the Federal Rules”).  See generally James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to
Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision
According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1277–80 (2010) (describing the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, as a whole, in the context of notice pleading, as opposed to code plead-
ing); supra notes 28–29.
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change in which the Advisory Committee felt empowered to take direct
action against what it saw as over-discovery by explicitly referencing propor-
tionality and incorporating the proportionality factors into the principal text
of Rule 26(b).  Perhaps Judge Niemeyer was right in 199370—the Advisory
Committee itself was not prepared to take the first step towards a full-throated
endorsement of a proportional scope for discovery, but with the Supreme
Court’s modification of the notice pleading standard as a catalyst, the Com-
mittee decided to tackle the issue.
II. INTERLUDE—DO WE IN FACT NEED PROPORTIONALITY TO CURTAIL
PURPORTED OVER-DISCOVERY?
The foregoing Part assumed that over-discovery is, in fact, an issue that
needs to be addressed.  However, is over-discovery actually an issue?  Is there
rampant “abuse and frivolous litigation and the need for cost reduction,” or
are such cries merely part of the “constant drumbeat of rhetoric[,] . . .
[u]rban legends[,] and cosmic anecdotes”?71  This debate is not a new one.
Indeed, Justice Powell, dissenting from the 1980 Amendments to the Federal
Rules, noted that “[t]here are wide differences of opinion within the profes-
sion as to the need for reform.”72  Justice Powell believed that the 1980
Amendments did too little to address “the acute problems associated with
discovery,” noting that the Rules “invite discovery of such scope and duration
that district judges often cannot keep the practice within reasonable
bounds.”73  The 1980 Committee, however, in withdrawing its amendment to
Rule 26—which would have narrowed the scope of discovery—noted that
“[a] number [of commenters] disputed the assumption that there was gen-
eral abuse of discovery,” and was not convinced empirical evidence sup-
ported the contention that discovery abuse was rampant.74
The debate certainly continues today.  Proponents of the 2015 Amend-
ment package believed that the modifications to the scope of discovery
“would constitute a significant improvement to the rules governing discov-
ery” and would help to curb widespread over-discovery.75  Critics of the pack-
age largely believed that it was “a solution in search of a problem—that
discovery in civil litigation already [was] proportional to the needs of
cases.”76
70 Niemeyer, supra note 30, at 520 (“Despite any temptation to engage in this debate,
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee cannot, in any practical way, now attempt to undo the
1938 experiment of notice pleading coupled with broad discovery because that formula
has become embedded in the infrastructure of American civil procedure.”).
71 Miller, supra note 23, at 598.
72 Transmission to Congress of the 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Powell, J., dissenting), reprinted in 85 F.R.D. 521, 522 (1980).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 541–42.
75 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 82.
76 Id. at 81.
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The Advisory Committee falls into the former category.  It considered
several studies over the course of its deliberations in order to better under-
stand the allegations of pervasive over-discovery in the federal litigation sys-
tem.77  The Committee asserted that the surveys collectively showed
practitioners’ “great[ ] dissatisfaction with the costs and extent of civil discov-
ery.”78  It noted that one survey primarily concluded that “today’s civil litiga-
tion system takes too long and costs too much, resulting in some deserving
cases not being brought and others being settled to avoid the costs of litiga-
tion,” with “[a]lmost half of . . . respondents believ[ing] that discovery is
abused in almost every case.”79  The Committee emphasized one survey’s
conclusion that “[p]roportionality should be the most important principle
applied to all discovery,”80 with other surveys finding that “judges do not
enforce proportionality limitations on their own.”81
The Committee also commissioned the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to
perform a large survey of a broad cross-section of attorneys of record on fed-
eral cases terminating in 2008.82  The Committee wrote of the FJC study:
Although the FJC study found that a majority of lawyers thought that
the discovery in a specific case they handled generated the “right amount” of
information, and more than half reported that the costs of discovery were
the “right amount” in proportion to their client’s [sic] stakes in the closed
cases, a quarter of attorneys viewed discovery costs in their cases as too high
relative to their clients’ stakes in the case. . . . The FJC study revealed agree-
ment among lawyers representing plaintiffs, defendants, and both about
equally, that the rules should be revised to enforce discovery obligations
more effectively.83
In sum, the Committee was “convinced that . . . emphasizing proportion-
ality in Rule 26(b)(1) [would] help achieve the just, speedy, and efficient
resolution of civil cases.”84
However, such conclusions drew heavy criticism from numerous observ-
ers.  First, opponents of the amendment package largely asserted that the
77 See id. at 82–83.
78 Id. at 83.
79 Id.; see EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 71 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 FJC
REPORT], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
80 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 83 (quoting AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAW. & INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 7 (2009), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/publications/actl-iaals_final_report_rev_8-4-10.pdf).
81 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 83; see CORINA D. GERETY & BRITTANY K.T.
KAUFFMAN, SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE PROCESS: 2008–2013, at
46–47 (2014), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/summary_
of_empirical_research_on_the_civil_justice_process_2008-2013.pdf.
82 2009 FJC REPORT, supra note 79, at 5, 77–78.
83 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 82–83; see 2009 FJC REPORT, supra note 79, at
27–28, 61–62.
84 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 82.
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surveys—aside from the FJC survey—upon which the Committee relied were
not “empirical research studies” at all.  Rather, detractors asserted, the (non-
FJC survey) research and surveys conducted on behalf of the Advisory Com-
mittee “consisted of opinion surveys, not studies of actual case files.  This is
problematic because people’s perceptions are subject to a variety of psycho-
logical biases that distort objective reality.”85  In fact, Professor Patricia
Moore states that:
Had the opinion surveys (other than the FJC study) . . . been the subject of a
Daubert motion to strike, it is likely that the judges on the Committee would
[have] found the surveys unreliable and inadmissible. . . . Almost none of
[the] conditions for a reliable survey was present in the opinion surveys.86
The Committee’s response to such criticism of survey methodology is
that the objectors “seem to draw from a particularized concept of what consti-
tutes empirical research,” and that if “more rigorous work comparing the
actual results in terms of cost, time, and outcome of applying different dis-
covery regimes to cases” supporting “accurate measurements” was to be
attempted, the delay in “[a]waiting work of that character could easily para-
lyze all reform.”87  Although such concerns may be true, the Committee’s
justification does not squarely address the legitimate criticisms raised by
observers as to the studies’ methodologies.
Observers also challenged the Committee’s interpretation of the FJC
study.88  The Committee seemed to downplay many of the FJC’s findings,
instead focusing on the “quarter of attorneys [who] viewed discovery costs in
their cases as too high relative to their clients’ stakes in the case,” ultimately
concluding that litigants agree that the “rules should be revised to enforce
discovery obligations more effectively.”89  However, Professor Moore and
others asserted that, “[i]f anything, the FJC’s closed-case study prepared for
the Duke Conference indicates that lawyers have internalized the concept of
proportionality in discovery. . . . The FJC’s findings cannot reasonably be
85 Moore, supra note 27, at 1131; see also Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narra-
tive in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1099–1102 (2012)
(describing the surveys as part of a “cost-and-delay narrative” that “reflected the concerns
and beliefs among legal professionals,” but that fall squarely outside of the realm of empiri-
cal research).
86 Moore, supra note 27, at 1131.
87 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 115.
88 These observers do, however, acknowledge that the FJC study was empirical in
nature. See Moore, supra note 27, at 1131 (“The FJC’s study was by far the best-designed
and most probative, because it randomly selected attorneys of record on all cases that
closed in the last quarter of 2008.” (footnote omitted)); Reda, supra note 85, at 1108
(“That the closed-case study methodology goes some way to alleviating the flaws of attorney
opinion surveys is suggested by some of the findings of the 2009 FJC study itself.”); see also
HELEN HERSHKOFF ET AL., JOINT COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER], http://www.lfcj
.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/joint_professor_comment_2.5.14.pdf (acknowledging
that the FJC study was “a careful and exhaustive study”).
89 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 82, 83.
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interpreted as an overall failure of lawyers and judges to apply proportional-
ity.”90  Others noted that the FJC study “fail[ed] to demonstrate that dispro-
portionality is a systemic problem,” and that its findings “undercut the
conventional wisdom, repeated in headlines and sound bites, that discovery
costs are far-and-away the most significant part of total litigation costs in fed-
eral cases.”91  The Committee’s response to such criticism was simply that it
“does not agree that the FJC survey or other surveys prepared for the confer-
ence suggest no need for change.”92
An additional disagreement, of many,93 with the Committee’s 2015 pro-
portionality amendments was that (1) “most cases involve minimal or no dis-
covery,” and (2) “the minority of cases in which discovery costs are high will
not be affected by the proposed amendments.”94  Opponents of the amend-
ments pointed out that empirical research supported “the view that the fed-
eral civil system is highly effective in most cases, that total costs develop in
line with stakes, and that discovery volume and cost is proportional to the
amount at stake.”95  Indeed, the Committee appeared to accept this asser-
tion, writing that “[t]he proposal to amend Rule 26(b)(1) ‘will not affect
most cases.’  But it will force discussions among the parties and with the court
in complex cases.  That is the intent, and much good can be accomplished
without significant harm.”96  However, this logic does not seem to support
such comprehensive reform, and only serves to bolster allegations that the
amendment package was “a solution in search of a problem.”97
Finally, Professor Arthur R. Miller—who originally helped to insert the
concept of proportionality into the Federal Rules as former reporter to the
Advisory Committee during the 1983 amendments—now appears to disap-
prove of the proportionality amendments on an access-to-justice basis.  Pro-
fessor Miller laments the “[d]ecisions and rules amendments [that] have
erected a series of procedural stop signs that narrow citizen access to
court,”98 and warns that new Rule 26(b) “is a significant difference from what
90 Moore, supra note 27, at 1113 (citation omitted).  This is despite the fact that the
FJC study’s “researchers were very careful to frame their research to find cases that
involved as much discovery as possible.  Thus, they systematically excluded from their study
any cases in which discovery was unlikely to take place,” leaving “a study that likely over-
represented how much discovery takes place in a typical civil case in federal court.”  2014
JOINT COMMENTS LETTER, supra note 88, at 3 (emphasis added).
91 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER, supra note 88, at 3; see also Reda, supra note 85, at
1089 (“The 2009 FJC study rang false.  It did not support anything that attorneys knew
about the civil justice system.” (footnote omitted)).
92 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 82.
93 For a thorough discussion of opponents’ arguments against the Committee’s
amendments, see generally 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER, supra note 88; Moore, supra
note 27; Reda, supra note 85.
94 See 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER, supra note 88, at 2–4.
95 Reda, supra note 85, at 1089.
96 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 132.
97 Id. at 81.
98 Id. at 173.
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the limited 1983 amendment intended.”99  Professor Miller believes that the
2015 Amendments “turn away from the original vision of a relatively unfet-
tered and self-executing discovery regime,” and instead believes that “pro-
moting cooperation between and among counsel” is the best technique to
“promote our public policies.”100  Further, Professor Miller noted that “there
is not yet any showing that the amendments made in 1983, 1993, and 2000 to
narrow discovery have had any effect.”101
In sum, there was a clear disagreement between outside observers and
the Advisory Committee on whether or not the proportionality amendments
were actually needed.  It is unclear that there is substantial evidence support-
ing the common cry of broad over-discovery and discovery abuses in the
American litigation system.  Critics justly pointed out numerous concerns
with the empirical methods behind the surveys relied upon by the Advisory
Committee to justify the need for proportionality in discovery.
Regardless of whether over-discovery is actually as prevalent as asserted
by the Committee, the fact remains that the proportionality amendments to
Rule 26(b) have taken effect.  Therefore, the following Part will analyze—
assuming arguendo that over-discovery should be curtailed through a pro-
portional scope of discovery—whether or not the 2015 Amendments to Rule
26 in fact achieve the goal of curbing over-discovery and whether or not the
Amendments use the appropriate means to do so.
III. THE 2015 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 26
A. Subject-Matter Discovery
The 2015 Amendments to Rule 26(b) made two major changes: first,
subject-matter discovery, even with good cause, was wholly removed.102  After
the 2000 Amendments—in which the default scope of discovery was changed
from relevant subject-matter discovery to matters relevant to the claim at
issue, with subject-matter discovery allowed only for good cause103—federal
litigants very rarely invoked the subject-matter discovery language.104
Because parties were able, of course, to frame their discovery requests in
whatever manner they chose, it is very likely that, in the vast majority of cases,
they simply termed most (if not all) requests as relevant to the claim at
99 Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 324 n.140 (2014).
100 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 173.
101 Id.  Interestingly, Justice Powell, advocating for proportionality in 1980, invoked
access to justice to promote the opposite view. See Transmission to Congress of the 1980
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Powell, J., dissenting), reprinted in 85
F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (“[A]ll too often, discovery practices enable the party with greater
financial resources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent.  The mere
threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospective
litigants.”).
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 32–39.
104 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 103.
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issue—especially in light of the Advisory Committee’s 2000 acknowledge-
ment that “[t]he dividing line between information relevant to the claims
and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action can-
not be defined with precision.”105  Indeed, the 2015 Duke Conference Sub-
committee recognized that “[p]arties should be able to justify reasonable
discovery as relevant to the claims or defenses” in lieu of subject-matter dis-
covery.106  In light of this, it comes as no surprise that “[e]limination of ‘sub-
ject matter’ discovery has not generated much excitement,” and it is unlikely
that much, if any, impact will be seen from this deletion.107
B. Proportionality
Second, and more significantly, the proportionality factors were labeled
as such and were moved into the main text of Rule 26(b).  Although the
word “proportional” appeared nowhere in 2014 Rule 26(b),108 the factor in
2014 Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)109 was generally accepted to be a rough measure
of whether the discovery requested was proportional.110  Located in a sepa-
rate subpart of Rule 26(b) since their introduction in 1983, the Committee
later sought to emphasize these factors in the 2000 Amendments by adding
to Rule 26(b)(1) a sentence specifically directing parties’ attention to
them.111  This attempt was largely ignored by parties and the courts.112  By
using the label “proportional” and by moving the factors themselves into the
discovery scope section of Rule 26(b), the Committee has made its change
that most clearly “underlines the importance of the concept [of proportion-
ality] and discourages parties and courts from expanding the scope of discov-
ery beyond what is proportional.”113
The scope of discovery is now styled as “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case,” in consideration of the proportionality factors: “the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Note (2000), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340, 389
(2000).
106 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 120.
107 Id.
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 36–39.
109 “[T]he burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra
note 9.
110 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 56, at 422 (“Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) requir[es] discov-
ery to be proportional to the needs of the case.”); ROWE ET AL., supra note 56, at 125 (“Rule
26(b)(2)(C) limits discovery when it is . . . disproportionate because ‘the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37)).
111 See supra text accompanying notes 43–52.
112 See supra note 52.
113 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 126.
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access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”114  Such language is a dra-
matic turn from the former scope of “any nonprivileged matter that is rele-
vant to any party’s claim or defense.”115
Moving the proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to the defini-
tion of the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) changed the process by which
parties invoke the concept of proportionality (in current parlance, “the bur-
den or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,”116
and/or “undue burden”117) as a shield against a discovery request.  For-
merly, when a request for discovery was made, the requesting party had one
purported hurdle to clear: relevancy.  However, “in reality the bar of rele-
vancy is set so low as to present virtually no burden at all.”118  Of course, the
requesting party also wrote the request for discovery, and could “remain
intentionally vague and speak in the broadest of terms with discovery
demands” in order to “craft discovery requests that are at least germane to
the case on [their] face,” further obviating any protections relevancy may
have offered.119
After receiving such a “relevant” request, a party was required to provide
the requested discovery.120  But what if the party believed that the request
was disproportionate?  The 2014 Rules allowed her to seek a protective order
from the court under Rule 26(c), shielding her from the alleged “undue bur-
den or expense” she had detected.121  However, the resisting party “b[ore] a
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 36.
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37.
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 39.
118 Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 520.
119 Id. In fact, a requesting party’s burden was generally merely to ensure that “the
discovery sought appear[ed] relevant on its face.”  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Puccinelli, 224 F.R.D.
677, 684 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.R.D. 642, 643 (D. Kan.
2003)).  If this low bar was met, the burden then shifted to the resisting party “to establish
the lack of relevance.” Id. (citing McCoy, 214 F.R.D. at 643).  The burden, therefore, was
largely on the resisting party to disprove relevancy, rather than on the requesting party to
prove it. See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 32(b)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37
(“The interrogatories must be answered . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (2014),
reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 53 (“The party to whom the request [for produc-
tion] is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served.”).
121 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 39; see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37 (noting
that the court must limit unduly burdensome requests “[o]n motion or on its own”).  Of
course, the party could have elected to make an objection vis-a`-vis the proportionality fac-
tors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) instead of moving for a protective motion. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
33(b)(4) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 52 (suggesting objections as
responses to interrogatories); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R.,
supra note 9, at 53 (suggesting objections as responses to requests for production).  Under
the Rules, it is the resisting party’s choice which method to use. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33
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heavy burden,” and was required to make a substantial good cause showing
before a court granted a protective order, particularly on proportionality
grounds.122
Specifically, in order to receive a Rule 26(c) protective order, as in 2014,
a party resisting discovery today
must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact” in support of its
request and may not rely upon “stereotyped and conclusory statements.”
This typically means that the party seeking a protective order based on
undue burden or expense must submit affidavits or other detailed explana-
tion as to the nature and extent of the claimed burden or expense.123
The resisting party has the burden “to show some plainly adequate rea-
son for the [protective order];” merely showing “some inconvenience and
expense does not suffice to establish good cause for issuance of a protective
order.”124  Further, the resisting party must meet this high, fact-intensive bar
for every request she is resisting—including, for example, every interrogatory
from which she wants protection.125
Once a resisting party meets this high bar, moreover, she faces perhaps
the most significant hurdle to vault: judicial reluctance to grant protective
orders.  Although 2014 Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) provided judges with
vast power to do so, “the courts [had] been reluctant to utilize the tools avail-
able to control runaway discovery,” for two major reasons:
First, ever since the federal rules introduced modern discovery provisions,
allowing parties to present claims for which they otherwise would have had
no evidence and revolutionizing the way in which cases are prepared for
trial, there has been a cultural climate favoring liberal disclosure and look-
Advisory Committee’s Note (1970), reprinted in 48 F.R.D. 487, 522 (1970) (“[T]he respond-
ing party who believes that some parts or all of the interrogatories are objectionable may
choose to seek a protective order under . . . Rule 26(c) or may serve objections . . . .”).
Either form is subject to roughly the same analysis. See infra notes 123–25 and accompany-
ing text.  Whichever form the resisting party chooses, it is important she “not remain com-
pletely silent when [she] regards discovery as improper,” lest she lose her opportunity to
make the objection. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 2035, at 154.
122 Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 519–20.
123 Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 536–37 (D. Kan. 2003) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)).
124 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev. 1989);
see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Broad allega-
tions of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy
the Rule 26(c) test . . . . Moreover, the harm must be significant, not a mere trifle.”).
125 Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296–97 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (explain-
ing that boilerplate objection as to burden was not enough for a protective order; rather,
the resisting party “must show specifically how, despite the broad and liberal construction
afforded the federal discovery rules, each interrogatory is not relevant or how each ques-
tion is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive . . . by submitting affidavits or offering
evidence revealing the nature of the burden” (citations omitted)); see also Netzorg & Kern,
supra note 8, at 522 (“Courts with crowded dockets seem to prefer—or are simply more
accustomed to—resolution of discovery disputes by an itemized analysis of each disputed
discovery request and the sufficiency of the specific objection.”).
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ing with disfavor on efforts to limit it.  Second, judges and magistrates, who
are often assigned tasks relating to disputes over discovery, are too often out
of touch with the cases during the pretrial stage to make meaningful deci-
sions about discovery; it is the parties who are aware of the real issues
involved.126
With these barriers in place, it is not altogether surprising that, despite
the protections written into 2014 Rule 26 in an attempt to wrangle over-dis-
covery, “[s]till largely missing [was] any assessment of whether the discovery
sought [was] proportional in its broader context, considering the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the significance of the issues, and the
resources of the parties.”127
New Rule 26 attempts to remove many of these purported barriers to
proportional discovery.128  By directly limiting its scope to that discovery
which is proportional to the needs of the case, the Advisory Committee has
explicitly endorsed proportional discovery in the text of the Rules, something
it has not done in the past.  Therein may lie a powerful aspect of the 2015
discovery amendments: district court judges and magistrate judges may be
less hesitant to limit discovery—less committed to the traditional notion of
extremely liberal discovery—with an overt, unambiguous, and unavoidable
commitment on the part of the Advisory Committee (and therefore, at least
tacitly, the Supreme Court129) to proportionality.  Instead of the “dormant”
undue burden protections formerly in effect, judges may now feel empow-
ered (obligated, perhaps) to use their broad discovery power and discretion
to carry out the proportionality directive in new Rule 26(b)(1).130
Apart from this cultural “rebranding” of sorts, however, it is unclear—
assuming, as the Committee asserts, that over-discovery is a pervasive prob-
lem and that proportionality is the solution131—that the proposed Rule goes
far enough to substantively address the problem.  Because of the way in
which the Advisory Committee inserted the proportionality language, the
question of which party will bear the burden of (dis)proving proportionality
of discovery requests is ambiguous.  As the Committee simply inserted the
“proportional to the needs of the case” language after the “relevant to any
party’s claim or defense” language, a reasonable interpretation is that courts
are to treat such proportionality as they have treated relevancy.
126 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 56, at 421–22 (footnote omitted); see also Netzorg &
Kern, supra note 8, at 522 (“In short, the ‘strong preference for broad production’ contin-
ues to dominate.”).
127 Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 522.
128 But see supra text accompanying notes 71–101 (discussing whether amending Rule
26(b) in an attempt to achieve proportionality is necessary).
129 See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 2072(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4648 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . .”)).
130 But see 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 125 (“[I]ncreased prominence [of the
proportionality factors] also may be resisted by judges who will see this as imposing a new
obligation on them rather than a shared obligation of the parties and the court.”).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 71–101.
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If courts do elect to treat proportionality as they have relevancy, a basic
proportionality framework can be established.  First, the requesting party will
serve discovery requests upon the resisting party.  The resisting party, believ-
ing the request to be disproportionate to the needs of the case, considering
the proportionality factors, will either object (in which case the requesting
party will file a motion to compel) or file a Rule 26(c) motion for a protective
order.  In either case, the request will be subject to a two-part analysis.  First,
the court will determine whether the request is proportionate on its face.132
Here, the requesting party will have the burden of showing the proportional-
ity of the request.133  Thereafter, the burden will shift to the resisting party to
show that the request is not proportional.134
The issue with this framework is that courts are accustomed to the bulk
of the burden falling on the resisting party to show that the request is outside
of the scope of discovery.135  Since relevancy is such a low bar to the request-
ing party, only the most egregious discovery requests are filtered by the first-
step analysis of relevancy on the face of the request.136  Of course, this low
bar is set in the context of the “broad scope of relevance as defined under
Rule 26(b)(1).”137  In one scenario, then, courts will look to the factors listed
in proposed Rule 26(b)(1) to establish the scope of proportionality, and the
initial screen of proportionality “on the face” of the discovery request will not
be as easily defeated as that for relevancy.  In this case, the goals of propor-
tionality would likely be well served, as the burden will rest with the request-
ing party to show that her request is proportional to the needs of the case.
However, it is entirely possible that courts will trend towards the practice of
filtering only the most extremely inappropriate requests in the first (“on its
face”) stage, and instead will shift the burden to the resisting party to provide
“an itemized analysis of each disputed discovery request and the sufficiency
of the specific objection.”138
Requiring the resisting party to bear the burden of showing a dispropor-
tionate request will likely do little to discourage disproportionate discovery
requests—assuming, as the Committee did, that they are prevalent.139  If one
132 Cf. Ficep Corp. v. Haas Metal Eng’g, Inc., No. 14-243, 2015 WL 566988, at *2 (D.
Kan. Feb. 11, 2015) (“A request for discovery should be allowed ‘unless it is clear [on its
face] that the information sought can have no possible bearing’ on the claim or defense of
a party.” (quoting Stewart v. Mitchell Transp., No. 01-2546, 2002 WL 1558210, at *4 (D.
Kan. July 11, 2002))).
133 Cf. McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.R.D. 642, 643–44 (D. Kan. 2003).
134 Cf. id.
135 See Philip J. Favro & Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for Proportionality
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 975 (arguing that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) contains a “quirk” that “unfairly shifts [the] burden to
the responding [i.e., resisting] party”); see also supra notes 122–28.
136 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
137 McCoy, 214 F.R.D. at 643.
138 Netzorg & Kern, supra note 8, at 522.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 74–105.
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of the major issues with today’s discovery system is “impositional discovery”140
or “litigation by extortion,”141 requiring the very party that needs protection
from (threats of) a deluge of discovery requests to overcome a tacit presump-
tion of proportionality does not seem to address the problem squarely.  Such
a presumption would not disincentivize disproportionate discovery requests.
Both opponents of the proportionality amendments and the Advisory
Committee itself seem to prefer the latter scenario in which the resisting
party bears the burden of showing that a request is disproportionate.142  It is
clearly sensible for opponents to disagree with any burden shifting, as they
do not agree with the Committee that over-discovery is rampant in the fed-
eral litigation system—a new burden upon requesting parties, therefore,
would be unjustified and would “encourage a higher degree of litigation over
the scope of discovery and increase costs both for litigants and the court
system.”143  The Committee’s reason for opposing the burden shift, however,
is less convincing.  Asserting that Rule 26(g)—which requires requesting par-
ties to certify that their requests are “neither unreasonable nor unduly bur-
densome or expensive”144—“already imposes on the requesting party the
responsibility to ensure that the request is not unreasonably burdensome or
expensive,” the Committee rejects any implication that new Rule 26 has or
should have a new burden upon the requesting party.145  However, this raises
the question: If Rule 26(g), as it existed in 2014, was so well-poised to address
the proportionality issue by ensuring that parties do not request dispropor-
tionate discovery, why amend Rule 26 in the first place?
The Advisory Committee seems to have considered this during delibera-
tions, and explicitly asserts that new Rule 26 does not “shift the burden of
proving proportionality to the party seeking discovery.”146  Indeed, the Com-
mittee Note to be published alongside new Rule 26 states: “Restoring the
proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing
responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality, and
the change does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of
addressing all proportionality considerations.”147  The Committee seems to
have embraced ambiguity over clarity: it is unclear whether or not the Advi-
sory Committee intends for courts to place the initial burden of showing
(dis)proportionality of disputed requests on the requesting or resisting party.
The Committee Note simply states that “[t]he parties and the court have a
collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and
140 Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 638.
141 Ellis & Shah, supra note 59, at 67–68.
142 See, e.g., 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 123; 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER,
supra note 88, at 9.
143 2014 JOINT COMMENTS LETTER, supra note 88, at 9.
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 41.
145 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 123.
146 Id. at 84.
147 Id. at 101.
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consider it in resolving discovery disputes.”148  This ambiguous placement of
the burden may lead to inconsistent applications of the new Rule.  Even if the
Committee chose to leave the burden on the resisting party to prove dispro-
portionality, it should have at least clarified this by affirmatively stating which
side bears the burden.
Moreover, if it truly believes over-discovery to be a rampant problem,149
alternative burden models exist that could, in theory, create a uniformly
strong disincentive for disproportionate discovery requests.  For example, in
a comprehensive proportionality overhaul of Utah Rule 26—which influ-
enced the 2015 Federal Rule Amendments150—that state’s Advisory Commit-
tee included a separate subsection of Rule 26 entitled “Burden.”  This
subsection instructs: “The party seeking discovery always has the burden of
showing proportionality and relevance.”151  Utah’s Committee expressly
acknowledged that it was changing the burden of proof, writing:
 Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the
burden of proving that a discovery request was not proportional. . . . Today,
the party seeking discovery . . . has the burden of showing that the request is
“relevant to the claim or defense of any party” and that the request satisfies
the standards of proportionality.152
In essence, Utah’s Committee has “inver[ted]” the “incentive structure
of discovery,” as “[t]he requesting party is no longer essentially entitled to the
discovery, but must instead show a need for the discovery.”153  This explicit
defining of the burden ensures a uniform application of proportionality
throughout Utah.  Further, it theoretically provides strong incentives for par-
ties to weigh carefully the costs versus the benefits of a discovery request before
making the request, as they know that they bear the burden of a showing of
proportionality.  Indeed, one commentator suggests that this burden clarifi-
cation is one of “only three changes likely to have a positive effect on the
discovery process” out of the numerous modifications made to the Utah
rules.154
148 Id.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 74–105.
150 See, e.g., 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 85, 124, 133; see also PAULA HANNA-
FORD-AGOR & CYNTHIA G. LEE, UTAH: IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS TO RULE 26 ON DISCOVERY
PRACTICE IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURTS 4 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/
PDF/Topics/Civil%20Procedure/Utah%20Rule%2026%20Evaluation%20Final%20Re
port(2015).ashx (“[T]he revisions adopted by the Utah district courts have generated a
great deal of national interest.  Many court policymakers including the federal Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules are considering similar reforms . . . .”).
151 UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).  The burden will always lie with the party seeking discov-
ery, regardless of how the issue is raised—whether through an objection, a motion to com-
pel, or a motion for a protective order.  Favro & Pullan, supra note 135, at 971.
152 UTAH R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee Note (quoting UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
153 Marc Therrien, Note, Talkin’ ‘Bout a Revolution?: Utah Overhauls Its Rules of Civil Dis-
covery, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 669, 691.
154 Id. at 693.
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However, whether or not such a burden-shifting regime would effectively
mitigate purported over-discovery depends, somewhat circularly, on the prev-
alence and severity of over-discovery.  The significance of the burden of per-
suasion is “limited to those cases in which the trier of fact is actually in
doubt,”155 i.e., in those cases in which the scope of the discovery request is
neither clearly proportionate nor clearly disproportionate to the needs of the
case.  If clear, massive over-discovery is indeed rampant,156 therefore, a Utah-
style burden-shifting measure would likely have little impact, as the burden of
the proposed discovery would clearly outweigh the expense in these cases—
obviating any effect the burden may have.
It is unclear precisely why the (Federal) Committee declined to at least
clearly define who bears the burden of persuasion under new Rule 26.157
Regardless of the reason, failure to define the burden directly will likely lead
to non-uniform application of the new Rule and confusion among liti-
gants.158  Further, without a precise allocation of the burden to the request-
ing party, it is extremely likely that the burden will revert back to the resisting
party,159 clearly foreclosing a Utah-style approach to the burden.  Although
the Committee allocates the responsibility for proportional discovery to all of
the parties and the court collectively,160 it remains to be seen if this is a sensi-
ble approach to proportional discovery or an empty directive to stay the
course.161  Naturally, however, if there is not widespread over-discovery to
155 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 569 (4th ed. 1992).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 74–105.
157 There is some indication that the (Federal) Committee wished to relieve the “fear
that transposing [the proportionality factors] into the scope of discovery will change the
allocation of burdens between the requesting party and the resisting party.”  2014 AGENDA
BOOK, supra note 12, at 125.  To be sure, numerous published comments expressed such
concerns. E.g., id. at 200 (“Placing on plaintiffs the burden of proving proportionality is
harsh; their resources are generally more limited than defendants’ resources.”); id. at 223
(“The proposed rule imposes a multifactor proportionality standard that will place a heavy
burden on the party seeking discovery to satisfy proportionality.”).
158 E.g., id. at 206 (“The rule does not specify which party bears the burden of proof.
‘[I]t would be very helpful if the Committee would clearly state in the rule or notes that the
burden is on the objecting party.’” (alteration in original)).
159 See Favro & Pullan, supra note 135, at 975; Therrien, supra note 153, at 690–91.
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2015).
161 The proportionality factors have been largely ignored since their introduction in
1983. See Grimm & Yellin, supra note 52, at 515 (noting that proportionality limitations
will only be effective at curtailing over-discovery if they are “actually understood by lawyers
and enforced by judges, neither of which, experience suggests, appears to be the case”); see
also 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 84 (“If the expressions of concern [about over-
discovery] reflect widespread disregard of principles that have been in the rules for thirty
years [i.e., the proportionality factors], it is time to prompt widespread respect and imple-
mentation.”).  Such bold assertions were made with regard to the 1983 Amendments,
which had little effect on over-discovery. See MILLER, supra note 48, at 33 (touting the 1983
Amendments as a “180-degree shift” from the former rule, and stating that judges would
now be required “to limit discovery” if “the evils of redundancy and disproportionality”
became “manifest”); Miller Comment Letter, supra note 49, at 2 (“[T]he 1983 and 1993
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begin with,162 the point is moot, as there is nothing to change; litigants
would have already internalized proportionality regardless of a weak or a
forceful directive from the Committee.163
Apart from the addition of the overt proportionality references to Rule
26(b), the Committee may have infused proportionality into the discovery
process through another means: it has revised Rule 26(c) to “make explicit
the authority to enter a protective order that allocates the costs of respond-
ing to discovery” to the requesting party.164  Although this power previously
existed under Rule 26(c),165 it was not apparent from the text of Rule
26(c)—the Rule (non-exhaustively) lists eight remedies available to a court,
and does not explicitly include cost sharing among them.166  Under new
Rule 26(c), however, the court is plainly granted the cost-sharing authority,
as it may “specify[ ] terms, including time and place or the allocation of
expenses, for the disclosure or discovery.”167  This may be the most powerful
proportionality aspect of the Rule Amendments, as it could ensure that the
costs of especially prolific discovery requests are internalized by the request-
ing party.168
In sum, the Advisory Committee has created an imperfect solution to a
problem that may not be as rampant as it asserts.  This solution—the imposi-
tion of proportionality requirements through Rule 26—now applies to all
federal litigation, regardless of size or actual discovery expense of any one
case.  This may be a classic case of “trying to cure the symptoms rather than
the disease”: the Committee does not curtail the breadth or costs of the few
outlandishly expensive cases; rather it creates a Rule of broad application
that, as shown, will likely have little effect on the very cases at which it is
aimed.169  A better approach, perhaps, would be to attack the few “diseased”
amendments [specifically with regard to proportionality] do not appear to have brought
about the radical shift in practice I foresaw [in 1983] . . . .”).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 74–105.
163 See Moore, supra note 27, at 1113.
164 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 12, at 60.
165 See, e.g., Costantino v. City of Atlantic City, 152 F. Supp. 3d 311, 335–36 (D.N.J.
2015) (collecting cases prior to the 2015 Rule amendment); see also Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (developing cost-sharing factors).
166 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 39.
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (2015) (emphasis added).
168 Ironically, however, the Committee has downplayed the importance of costs in new
Rule 26(b) by changing the order of the proportionality factors. Compare FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014), reprinted in 2014 FED. R., supra note 9, at 37 (explaining that the
court must consider whether “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015) (moving said consideration to the
end of an eighty-six-word sentence).  This factor is no longer offset in its own subsection, as
it was in prior Rule 26, and so is now less prominent—indeed, it is the last factor in a long
list of considerations for the court.
169 See Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 858 (2015).
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cases and directly curtail their expenses, leaving the remaining inherently
proportional cases to be.170
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Advisory Committee, which promulgated
the 2015 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), inade-
quately addressed numerous concerns alleging that over-discovery is not as
rampant as the Committee believes it to be.  This failure to sufficiently
address such criticism, in turn, weakens the 2015 Amendments and raises
questions of why the Amendments are necessary.  Further, even if over-dis-
covery is a pervasive problem in the federal system of litigation, the Commit-
tee did not act forcefully enough to enact any actual change in federal
litigants’ behavior, further obviating any apparent effect the Amendments
will have on the costs of discovery or purportedly rampant discovery abuses.
170 See generally id. (proposing and explaining one method of directly controlling the
amount of money spent on discovery).
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